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HOW THE GOOD-WILL IS TO BE DEALT WITH IN
PARTNERSHIPS.
The good-will of a trade, business or house, is the value of
that reputation which it has acquired during its continuande,
and which induces the confidence or expectation that the same
or an increasing patronage will continue to be extended toward
the same so long as it is conducted in the same place, upon the
same principles. As Lord ELDON said, in Crutwell v. Lye, 17[
Vesey, 336, 346: " The good-will of a trade is nothing more
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the
old place." The character and value of a good-will is very
similar, in many respects, to those of a trade-mark. It serves
as an assurance to the customers, or purchasers, that they are
being dealt with fairly, or are obtaining the goods they desire.
And Courts of Equity protect the property in both much upon.
the same principle; that those who have created either a goodwill or a trade-mark, miust have done it by a long continuance
of fair dealing, and are therefore justly entitled to the advantages by vay of continued patronage flowing or likely to flow
therefrom. And, on the other hand, it is considered that one
who assumes the business name or the trade-mark of another,
does it for the purpose ofimposing upon the public a false belief
that he is the person whose business name he assumes, or that
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he sells the very manufacture which the trade-mark indicates.
This abuse is, therefore, restrained in equity by temporary and
perpetual injunctions, both upon the ground of wrong to the
owner, in depriving him of a just patronage which he would
otherwise receive, and equally of fraud and imposition upon the
public in regard to the persons with whom they are dealing,
or the commodities which they are purchasing.
Having sufficiently defined the nature of good-will, and why
it is fecogrized by the courts, and protected as an essential
and valuable interest and property, we have to consider how
the same is to be dealt with in closing up mercantile and other
partnerships.
Good-will seems to consist of two parts: the right to carry
on the same business in the old place and in the old name, and
the right to exclude all others from carrying on a similar business in the old name, or one so similar as not to indicate plainly
to the general public that there has been any change. For the
impression upon the public mind that no change, or at least
no essential change, has occurred in the business, seems to be
largely of the essence of the good-will. So also does the
right to exclude all others from so far carrying on a similar
business, at or near the same place, as materially to interfere
with the value of the old business, form a very important
element in the value of any partnership good-will. The
mere right, therefore, to carry on the old business at the old
place, and in the old name, must always be regarded as a
somewhat precarious property, and is only the lowest and
least valuable species of good-will. But this seems to be all
that ordinarily attaches to a mere trading partnership. The
articles of copartnership, or the contract upon which the association is founded, whether oral or written, may and sometimes
do provide for securing the good-will of the business exclusively
to the partnership, and in case of dissolution, either by effiux of
time, or the act of either party, or any other unforeseen event,
the contract may, and in strictness ought to, provide for the sale
of the good-will, as a partnership effect, and for the guaranty
of its protection from all infringement by any of the partners,
their agents or representatives. In such cases there can be no
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odoubt or difficulty in treating the good-will as a distinct and
appreciable portion of the effects of the partnership: Kennedy
v. Lee, 3 Mer. 441; Bryson v. Whitehead, 1 Sim. & Stu. 74;
Harrison v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198.
To this extent the good-will of a business carried on at a shop,
or other place of business, is ordinarily understood to pass by the
conveyance of the place where the business has been up to the
time carried on: Chissum v. Dewes, 5 Russ. 29. But unless
there be some covenant or contract, express or implied, on the
part of the former owner, not to engage in the same business at
the same place, there will be no mode of hindering or excluding
him from doing so. And on that account, as we have before
said, all such good-will must be regarded as extremely precarious, depending !o much upon the continued voluntary forbearance of the former owner. At the present day it is
presumable that very few such contracts are made without
being guarded by express stipulations against interference on
the part of the former owner.
But the same uncertainty occurs in case of every mercantile
or trading partnership (and it is much the same with partnerships for carrying on mechanical business), whenever it becomes
necessary to close up one of either class, and dispose of the
effects and distribute the avails to those entitled. If the organic contract of the association does not afford any definition
of the extent and mode of disposing of the good-will, it is
of necessity subject to all the uncertainties and contingencies
which we have already stated.
This is very well illustrated by the leading ca~e of Cook v.
Collingridge,Jac. 607, tried before Lord ELDON.

There seems

to have been no hesitation, on the part of his lordship, in treating the good-will of the partnership as a partnership interest
to be disposed of with the property. But as there was no
stipulation in the fundamental contract for its protection from
infringement by any of the partners setting up a similar business at the same place, there seemed no practicable mode of
treating the good-will of the concern as a distinct portion of the
partnership eltects, and, as such, subject to a separate valuation.
His lordship, therefore, ordered, with much minuteness of
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detail, that the estates and effects of the partnership should be
sold at public auction, and that the different partners might be
allowed to compete at the sale, and to enable strangers to have
the. same understanding of the probable value of the good-will
appurtenant to the property, it was ordered that the conditions
of sale, to be made known to the bidders in advance of the
time of final sale, should contain a statement of the profits for
three or four years preceding, and the names of the customers.
This case probably presents the fair and full state of the law
of partnership good-will at the time, and we are not aware that
it has received any essential modification since. Whenever the
partnership effects are to be converted into money, the goodwill forms a portion of such effects, either as appurtenant to the
ownership of the property and the right to occupy the place
where the business has been before carried on, or as a separate
and distinct right to continue the same business at the same
place and in the same name, and to exclude all others from
exercising a similar privilege to the extent of infringing the
exclusive rights of the purchaser of the good-will.
Those two species of good will may conveniently be distinguished as good-will in gross and good-will appurtenant to the
place and property. The latter species is probably of the most
frequent occurrence in partnerships, and by far the most difficult to deal with. All good-will must be of this character, in
partnerships, where the fundamental contract contains no stipu.
lations for its protection from being interfered with by the partiers after the disposition of the effects of the concern. It follows,
of course, inthis species of good-will, where the partnership is
dissolved by the death of one partner, that the good-will must
attach mainly to the survivor, since he is at liberty to continue
the same business at the same place and in the same name, so
far as his own name is concerned. And the sale of the property
will not give the purchaser the right to carry on the business
in the old name, except where the partnership contract contains
stipulations to that effect. This species of good-will, therefore,
which is merely appurtenant to the place or property, cannot
ordinarily be of much value. But, such as it is, the courts
seem inclined to treat it as belonging to the partnership, and
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dot attacning to the separate partners. Williams v. WMlkon, 4
Sandf. Ch. 379. Receivers are sometimes allowed to carry on
the partnership business for a time, in order to preserve the
good-will, which they cannot ordinarily do. fartin v. -Fan
S&haick, 4 Paige. 479. The question of the sale of good-will
is somewhat extensively examined and very ably discussed by
BIGELOW, Ch. J., in Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211, where
the present state of the law is clearly set forth. And in (hurton v. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, it seems to be considered

that the sale of a business impliedly carries the right to use
the old name in future, and an implied duty, on the part of
the vendor, not to use that name in carrying on any similar
business near the same place. But there will commonly be
some clew whereby as matter of fact the intent of the parties
may be inferred, and this must control.
The American courts and text writers seem not to have given
us always very definite notions uponthe subject of the good-will
in partnerships, and where they have, there does not seem to
be an entire agreement among them in regard to the precise
principles which should be applied to it. Thus Chancellor KEr,
3 Comm. 64, declares that the good-will of a trade is not partnership stock, and that it has been held to be the property of
the survivor, "which the law gives him to carry on the trade,
and that the representatives of a deceased partner cannot compel
a division of it," citing the earlier English cases, and expressing some doubt how far Orawshay v. Collins, 15 Vesey 218,
may be entirely consistent with his main proposition, but intimating that all question is removed by Lewis v. Langdon, 7
Sim., 421. This latter case decides nothing, but merely grants
a temporary injunction until the right could be tried at law.
And the doubt expressed in Crawshay v. Collins, whether the
good-will of the trade went to the survivor has long since
ripened into the settled rule of law. The rule of law now seems
to be entirely well settled in England-Smith v. Everett,27 Beav:
446-that the good-will in the partnership business does not,
on the death of one partner, survive beneficially to the others.
When it has any value a due proportion belongs to the estate
of the deceased partner, but the surviving partner has still
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the right to carry on the same business, and at the same place.
This seems to be intelligible, reasonable, and susceptible of
practical application, and, we .think, will be found the true
rule at the present time, although declared by Lord RomiLLY
more than ten years since. This is precisely in accordance
with the rule adopted by Lord ELDON, in (ook v. Collingridge,

as before stated.
But in Robertson v. Quiddington, 28 Beav. 529, it was held

that there was no good-will of a partnership separate from the
property of the firm and the place where it was carried on.
And it seems to have been considered, on the authority of Lewis
v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421, that the surviving partner was entitled to the use of the firm name, and if he owned the place, or
could obtain title to the use of it, could carry on the old business at the same place without interference, on the part of a
legatee, of a portion of the good-will, the remedy of the legatee,
if any, being against the executor, who had assigned the testa.
tor's interest in the trade premises to the surviving partner,
and might, therefore, very naturally be supposed to have received a consideration for the good-will of the business incident
or appurtpnant to the same. And in Bradburyv. Dickens, 27
Reav. 53, the question arose in regard to the good-will attaching to the publication of Household Words, which had been
published for a period by the plaintiff and others, in connection
with the defendant, he acting as editor. It was held that the
right to use the name must be sold for the benefit of the partners, it being part of the partnership assets, and that the
defendant could .not, therefore, be allowed to advertise its
continuance, except so far as concerned* himself.
It may be regarded, therefore, we think, as well settled in
the English courts- that the good-will of a partnership, either
as appurtenant to the property or in gross, according to the
nature of the contract, is to be regarded as a portion of the
assets, and as such, must be disposed of in closing the concern. And the same rule seems to be recognized in this country, as far as the subject has been definitely passed upon by the
courts. In Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, 1 Hoff. Oh. Rep. 68,
it was held that on a dissolution of the partnership the good-will
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will must be sold, and that it does not belong to the suriving
partners. The same is held in Halden v.MP'.Afakin, 1 Parsons
Cas. Eq. 270; Dayton v. Wilkes, 17 How. Pr. 510..
It has been held that the good-will of a professionalbusiness
is so exclusively mAde up of personal confidence, that it is ijot
susceptible of sale: Austen v. Boys, 27 Law J. Ch., 714. But
that rule has not commonly been adhered to in this coutrycertainly not to the fullest extent.

In Butler v. Bruleson, 16

Vt. 176, it was held that a contract on the part of a physician
not to practice within' a certain distance of another physician
was a binding contract, and one which courts of equity will
enforce by injunction.
The good-will of a business has been held incident to the stock
and lease, and not to premises where the business was carried
on.

England v. Downs, 6 Beav. 269; Doughety v. Van Nos.

trand, supra. But the good-will of a business may pass as
appurtenant to the shop where it was carried on. Chissum
v. Dews, 5 Russ. 29.
There is no principle of law better settled, or more uniformly
acted upon by the courts of equity, than that the property in
good-will shall have the protection afforded by injunction,
Elves v. Crofts, 14 Jur. 855. Courts of equity always interfere to prevent a party from carrying on a similar business in a
similar name, so near the old place of business as materially to
lessen its profits, or deceive the public as to the fact of who are
the real successors to the former proprietors, whenever such
party is under any legal obligations to refrain from doing so,
whether the obligation result from express stipulation or implied duty resulting from participating in the price of the sale
of the good-will of the old business: Perryv. Yruefitt, 6 Beav.
66; Aotley-v. Downman, 1 My. & Or. 14; Knott v.Morgan, 2
Keen 213, 219; Mogg v. Kirby, 8 Vessey 215; Bell v. Locke, 8
Paige 75. And the fact that there was no intentional decep.
tion will not excuse-the party: Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Or.
888.
Butit seems questionable sometimes, upon principle, how far
the mere sale of a business or good-will, either in gross or as
appurtenant to certain property, real or personal, which is the
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more common mode, will justify the use of the names of the
vendors or of the old firm in continuing it, without adding successors, or some indication that the vendors are not still
personally responsible. It would be obvious, in some cases,
thtt no such thing could have been expected, as, for instance,
where the business had always been carried on in the names of
the vendors, and there had been no long continuance of the
house, and where permission to continue the names of the vendors would carry responsibility for all the undertakings of the
vendees, or any succession of partners. But in other cases,
where the firm name had become the name of the house, without
reference to the names of the owners, as is not uncommon with
mercantile and banking houses in this country, to some extent,
and very largely in European countries, it might be more natural
to expect, in the sale of the business, that the purchaser might
expect to continue the old name. See Howe v. Seawing, 6 Bosw.
854. But always, it is presumed, the old name may be used
by giving proper indemnity to the vendors. So that this must
depend very much upon circumstances.
Having thus referred, very briefly, to most of the decided
cases upon the subject of the good-will of partnerships, and the
manner in which it is to be treated in closing their accounts, it
seems very obvious to conclude, as we have already sufficiently
indicated, that it is always to be regarded as a property belonging to the concern, more or less valuable, according to circumstances, but always to be so disposed of as to be rendered most
available to all the partners, so far as may be consistent with
the fundamental contract of the association, and the particular
circumstances resulting in the dissolution.
I. F. I.

